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Such were the usual materials
and arrangements of the hosts that fought for Carthage, but the troops under Hasdrubal were not in all respects thus constituted or thus
stationed. He seems to have been especially deficient in cavalry, and he had few African troops, though some Carthaginians of high rank were with
him. His veteran Spanish infantry, armed with helmets and shields, and short cut-and-thrust swords, were the best part of his army. These, and
his few Africans, he drew up on his right wing, under his own personal command. In the center he placed his Ligurian infantry, and on the left
wing he placed or retained the Gauls, who were armed with long javelins and with huge broad swords and targets. The rugged nature of the ground
in front and on the flank of this part of his line made him hope that the Roman right wing would be unable to come to close quarters with these
unserviceable barbarians before he could make some impression with his Spanish veterans on the Roman left.
This was the only chance that he had of victory or safety, and he seems to have done every thing that good generalship
could do to secure it. He placed his elephants in advance of his center and right wing. He had caused the driver of each of them to be
provided with a sharp iron spike and a mullet, and had given orders that every beast that became unmanageable, and ran back upon his own
ranks, should be instantly killed, by driving the spike into the vertebra at the junction of the head and the spine. Hasdrubal's elephants
were ten in number. We have no trustworthy information as to the amount of his infantry, but it is quite clear that he was greatly
outnumbered by the combined Roman forces.
The tactic of the Roman legions had not yet acquired that perfection which it received from the military genius of Marius,
and which we read of in the first chapter of Gibbon. We possess in that great work, an account of the Roman legions at the end of the
commonwealth, and during the early ages of the empire, which those alone can adequately admire who have attempted a similar
description.
We have also, in the sixth and seventeenth books of Polybius, an elaborate discussion on the military system of the Romans
in his time, which was not far distant from the time of the battle of the Metaurus. But the subject is beset with difficulties; and instead
of entering into minute but inconclusive details, I would refer to Gibbon's first chapter as serving for a general description of the Roman
army in its period of perfection, and remark, that the training and armor which the whole legion received in the time of Augustus was, two
centuries earlier, only partially introduced. Two divisions of troops, called Hastati and Principes, formed the bulk of each Roman legion
in the second Puinic war. Each of these divisions was twelve hundred strong.
The Hastatus and the Princeps legionary bore a breast-plate, or coat, of mail, brazen greaves, and a brazen helmet, with a
lofty upright crest of scarlet or black feathers. He had a large oblong shield; and, as weapons of offense, two javelins, one of which was
light and slender, but the other was a strong and massive weapon, with a shaft about four feet long, and an iron head of equal length. The
sword was carried on the right thigh, and was a short cut-and-thrust weapon, like that which was used by the Spaniards.
Thus armed, the Hastati formed the front division of the legion, and the Principes the second. Each division was drawn up
about ten deep, a space of three feet being allowed between the files as well as the ranks, so as to give each legionary ample room for the
use of the javelins, and of his sword and shield. The men in the second rank did not stand immediately behind those in the first rank, but
the files were alternate, like the position of the men on a draught-board. This was termed the quincunx order. Niebuhr considers that this
arrangement enabled the legion to keep up a shower of javelins on the enemy for some considerable time. He says, "When the first line had
hurled its pila, it probably stepped back between those who stood behind it, and two steps forward restored the front nearly to its first
position; a movement which, on account of the arrangement of the quincunx, could be executed without losing a moment. Thus one line
succeeded the other in the front till it was time to draw the swords; nay, when it was found expedient, the lines which had already been in
the front might repeat this change, since the stores of pila were surely not confined to the two which each soldier took with him into
battle.
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